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Introduction 
 
My interest in apartheid South Africa opened up during my time studying abroad last 
year. I had learned a brief history in a high school class, in which apartheid was literally 
translated to us as “apart-hood,” and the nuanced ethnic histories of South Africa were attempted 
to be explained as the last country to be liberated from colonization. In my time abroad, I clearly 
had to learn about the history of South Africa on a much deeper level. I learned about the 
intricacies of colonization on the western Cape from both the Dutch and British, which hold to 
this day significantly different memories among South Africans; the laws of apartheid, and how 
they effected the populations of black South Africans; and I learned about the organizations and 
individuals who lived and died fighting against apartheid. Being in the physical spaces of these 
histories was one of the most powerful learning tools I had available to me.  
Museums, monuments, memorials, cities, townships, mountains, houses and shacks, all 
acted as spaces of public history that gave me a physical connection to the history I was learning. 
Walking around Soweto, one of the most densely populated townships in the country, revealed 
the infrastructure of apartheid, and the systems that people still live in to this day. Though 
apartheid officially ended in 1994, the effects of it are withstanding through generations, into 
what many are now calling an “economic apartheid.”  
The striking reality of apartheid was the similarity to American Jim Crow laws, which I 
seem to have learned even less about in my education. It was through this fact that I became 
interested in the United States involvement in the liberation movements of young African 
nations. There are ways in which America has benefited from the liberation, colonization, and 
even oppression of these young nations. Apartheid is a system which the United States ultimately 
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benefitted from. Conversely, and despite being an unrealistic expectation, many believed that the 
United States played an important role as a global superpower in standing against apartheid.  
The United States while invested in its own civil rights movement, did not play a large 
role in apartheid, as American public interest did not pique until the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, 
apartheid in South Africa became a large issue in global politics. In 1985 there was a significant 
growth in American involvement against South African apartheid, as it saw a substantial rise in 
presidential, congressional, and public attention and discussion. The moral nature of the issue 
caused the deliberation around the subject to vary.  
The Reagan administration is an especially interesting perspective in which to analyze 
American involvement in South Africa.  As the face of modern conservatism, Reagan inherited a 
distanced role in South Africa, but as the president during a time of critical influence and 
participation in ending apartheid, he was forced to take a more comprehensive look. Throughout 
the early and mid 1980s, the Reagan administration held a relatively inactive role in addressing 
apartheid in South Africa, focusing their attention on the nation as a Western ally in the cold war, 
determined to prevent communist influence in southern Africa.  
When the administration was faced with more pressure to take an active approach in 
ending apartheid, Reagan held his attitude on a nonconfrontational relationship with South 
Africa, ultimately deciding that the benefits of an ally in the cold war was more worthwhile than 
to risk losing the ally ship by trying to undermine apartheid. The work of the Reagan 
administration toward South Africa was largely influenced and enacted by Chester Crocker, the 
Assistant Secretary of African Affairs. His work focused on maintaining a diplomatic 
relationship with South Africa, but eventually the issue was swept up in the politics between the 
executive and legislative branches.  
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Chester Crocker is a relevant character in my first and second chapters. In my first 
chapter I lay out the historical setting of the cold war in the 1980s, focusing on the role of the 
United States, Soviet Union, and South Africa—which had fallen on the cusp of differing 
ideologies. Crocker plays an integral role in laying the foundation of the Reagan administrations 
relationship with the South African government. Aside from Reagan himself, the members of his 
administration held an influential role in foreign policy coming out of the White House. In my 
second chapter I focus on the role the members of the administration played, such as Walter 
Raymond Jr. and John Poindexter, who advocated against South African and American reliance 
on the Soviet Union if the U.S. did not hold strong diplomatic ties to the southern African region.  
In my third and fourth chapter the focus of the paper turns specifically to 1985 and 1986 
and the growing American attention on South Africa as its political climate deteriorated and 
violence grew. At this time, congressional actions became significantly harsher, imposing the 
strongest sanctions on South Africa of the decade. I focus specifically on the Reagan 
administration’s deterrence toward sanctions and the documents and legislation coming out of 
the White House in response, which provide the rationale of the administration. In my fourth 
chapter I follow the same timeline of congressional acts, but focus more thoroughly on the life of 
the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and how its passing overtook the work being 
done by the Reagan administration. As I go through the debates surrounding the act, this chapter 
will also bring to light the reality that Reagan was unable to make realistic policies toward South 
Africa, and in turn Congress felt an obligation to step in.        
In this paper I utilize different sources to analyze the role the Reagan administration took 
in foreign policy toward South Africa. Two major secondary sources I relied on for 
contextualization were Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War, which categorized the global 
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nature of the cold war and the relationship between American and African interests; and Pauline 
Baker’s The United States and South Africa: the Reagan Years, which outlined much of the 
Reagan administration’s relationship to South Africa. These books served as a basis for much of 
my background information and research. I also relied heavily on The Reagan Diaries, and 
Chester Crocker’s memoir High Noon in Southern Africa as reflective first-hand accounts on the 
situation. I found many of my primary source documents in the Reagan Presidential Library in 
California. I primarily relied on the Walter Raymond and Dean McGrath files to find 
memorandums, collected documents and news articles, speeches, and addresses which fueled the 
arguments of this paper.    
Through the process of writing this paper I have been able to explore a more nuanced 
historical connection between the United States and South Africa. Since my time abroad, I have 
developed a deeper understanding of the American political and diplomatic aspects which were 
fostered in American involvement with South Africa. I hope through this paper I have reflected 
the truly interesting dynamic of American politics when facing the moral dilemma of apartheid 
and a global communist threat, and the influences of a conservative administration.  
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Chapter One: South Africa on the Cusp in a Global Cold War 
 
In order to fully understand the context of U.S. relations with South Africa, we must first 
consider the global historical context of the 1980s. The most important system in this global 
context to consider would be the cold war. For many, the cold war holds a very specific 
connotation as to the international relationships between ideologies. This is most commonly 
defined as the “period in which the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union dominated international affairs, roughly between 1945 and 1991,”1 and is often referred to 
as an ideological split with the West in favor of a capitalistic economic system, and the East in 
favor of communism. Though based in ideology, this war was also based in fear, and for many in 
the United States that meant the fear of a communist global domination.  
 Though the very bipolar view of the cold war’s East versus West perspective persists, we 
must acknowledge the dominating global influence of this discord, one which escalated the 
existence of conflict around the world. The interventionist attitudes of the United States and the 
Soviet Union was a major component of the cold war that brought this ideological struggle to 
countries not officially part of the East or West. During the 1980s Ronald Reagan held a very 
resolute view toward the Soviet Union and the cold war.  For him, the stakes were a moral 
obligation to uphold. The morality of the situation was not a choice, and in his eyes the strategic 
aim was as simple as “We win and they lose.”2 And yet, despite the seeming nonchalance of this 
statement, the reality was an unshakeable underlying fear, both in the threat of a communist 
takeover, and of an American loss.   
                                               
1 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, 12th ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 3  
2 Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 60. 
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Though American fear is a highly persuasive factor in the context of U.S. involvement, 
there is also the understanding of the third world which had a strong influence in the 
maneuvering of American interactions. According to Odd Arne Westad, a leading cold war 
historian, the “‘third world’ means the former Colonial or semi-Colonial countries in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including 
American and Russian) economic or political domination.”3 Ultimately, the third world refers to 
an exclusion, due partially to the historical background of these new nation-states, but also 
partially to the outlook of older, non-colonized nations.  
This exclusion was from both the Eastern or Western camps, and categorized these new 
countries as vulnerable to the corruption of an unwanted ideology. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s the obligation of intervention was placed onto those more powerful to steer them in the 
right direction. Westad argues that,   
The anti-Communist argument was no longer that socialism did not fit the ‘African tribal 
mentality’ or the ‘languid and quiescent’ African Americans, but the fear that 
communism might seduce adolescent African Americans.  In other words, moving 
Africans inside the realm of potential freedom increased the danger that they could move 
toward an ‘incorrect’ form of modernity. Freedom for Africans, both at home and abroad 
meant that the United States had to open up a new offensive in the Cold War.4  
In the later years of the cold war, leftist thought was a stronger threat to American interests in 
third world countries as these countries became more active and independent from colonial 
influence.    
For the countries coming out of colonial rule, specifically in Africa, there was a 
pendulum of thought going between the diametric systems, and as to which would fit best for 
their new governments. “But Marxism – especially in its Leninist form – had one great 
                                               
3 Westad, The Global Cold War, 3  
4 Ibid. 134.  
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advantage in countries where the authorities increasingly used different forms of racist ethnic 
categories to split the population and perpetuate their own rule. By subdividing people into their 
productive roles, as peasants, workers, or intellectuals, rather than into Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, 
Shona, or Ovambo, Marxism helped create at least the perspective of a united front against the 
regimes.”5 Thus lied the attraction toward Marxism for many of these states where racial 
divisions had been the distinguishing factors for power.  
In this light, the Soviet Union was the obvious choice of international support and held a 
growing importance in Africa throughout the 1970s and 1980s. “The increasingly important 
international role of the Soviet Union made many radical African leaders see Moscow as the 
global socialist counterweight to the United States, both providing a balance in international 
affairs that would help their revolutions and also assisting their movement with training, 
weapons, and supplies.” It was in this nature that made liberation movements in Southern Africa 
a threat to American ideals. Additionally, the obvious tension between the choice these new 
nations were facing made them a focal point to both U.S. and Soviet interests in Africa.      
“It was the Marxist orientation of many Southern African Liberation movements that made both 
Moscow and Washington take notice of their significance - to the United States, they threatened 
radical, Soviet-oriented regimes taking power in the Third World; to the Soviet Union, they 
hailed the beginning of a new stage of third world Social Development, in which African leaders 
acknowledged the superiority of ‘scientific Marxism.’”6  
The situation of the cold war becomes increasingly more complex when viewed through 
the lens of South Africa—a nation on the border between the Western allies and the “third 
                                               
5 Ibid. 207-208. 
6 Ibid. 207. 
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world.” As a country whose government was based in colonial settlement, South Africa had 
strong ties to the British commonwealth and its allies. But as a territory whose population was 
largely black Africans, many citizens felt ties to the neighboring region. “During the Cold War 
South Africa was the only independent country – besides the United States itself – where racial 
segregation was a matter of law. It was also by far the most important African country to the 
United States, in part because of its strategic location and in part because of its natural wealth.”7 
These factors were the basis for American cooperation with South Africa throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s.  
The history of apartheid also played a divisive role in the influence of the cold war on 
South African citizens, essentially breaking the country between the East and West perspectives. 
Before the official implementation of the apartheid governmental system in 1948, there were 
systems in place to ensure racial separation among South Africans. Among this legislation was 
the Black Land Act of 1913, the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923, and pass laws.8 These were 
the laws that apartheid was built on, with the intention of creating a nation fully segregated. 
These laws, specifically, are important to note as they were often considered in American 
discussions surrounding apartheid.  
The separation among races in South Africa was clear throughout apartheid, and even 
continued past the adoption of free elections. In the wake of this, the white and black populations 
                                               
7 Ibid. 133. 
8 “Apartheid Legislation 1850s-1970s,” South African History Online, last modified March 2011, 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/apartheid-legislation-1850s-1970s. The Black Land Act of 1913 inhibited black 
people from owning land outside of the designated reserves; the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923 allowed 
authorities to create and force Africans living in urban areas and to be moved to locations on the outskirts of white 
areas; and pass laws monitored the movement of people of color between racially separated spaces, and required 
black people to carry pass books which held information on their identity and where they were from as well as 
requiring them to get a permit before entering a white space. 
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inherited vastly different outlooks toward their role in South Africa, as well as the role of the 
nation in the rest of the world. With the white-majority government being based in colonial 
settlement, western nations were seen as closer allies than neighboring countries. For the black 
population, specifically those working to end apartheid, ally ship came from nations sympathetic 
of those being colonized, which consisted of other African nations seeking liberation as well as 
communist states. This detachment between politics in South Africa would ultimately lead to the 
situation of the 1980s. One in which, the South African government (SAG) was a defense against 
the role of communism in the eyes of the American government. Meanwhile, the African 
National Congress (ANC) one of the most prolific anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa, 
would be categorized as a terrorist organization in the 1980s due to its use of violence and 
backing by the Soviet Union.     
The stakes of the cold war made the United States’ relationship with South Africa 
increasingly more complicated and harder to maneuver. For the Reagan administration in the 
1980s, no matter how vehemently they opposed apartheid, it could never outweigh the dangers 
faced in allowing communism to take root in southern Africa. This was twofold, as South Africa 
acted as the military and financial force for liberalism in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique—
acting as a bulwark against the spread of communism. Moreover, if the apartheidal government 
were to be uprooted, there was an equal fear that a Marxist, black-majority government would 
take its place in South Africa. 
During Chester Crocker’s time as the Assistant Secretary of African Affairs the majority 
of his concern fell toward southern Africa. He is an interesting character to focus on in this 
situation because he reflects on Africa and the United States role there through a historical lens. 
In his memoir, High Noon in Southern Africa: Creating Peace in a Rough Neighborhood 
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Crocker reflects on the colonial legacy that existed in 1981 when he first joined the Reagan 
administration, as the highest-ranking member involved in African matters. From a further 
historical perspective, his writing shows a constant awareness of East-West tensions, and how 
much Africa had fallen between the two.9 
Crocker is an important member of the Reagan administration to focus on. Through his 
writings it seems he is openly and actively supportive of the Reagan administration and the 
stance it takes toward South Africa and its neighboring countries. And yet, Crocker offers a lot of 
critical reflection on his time in post as well as for the missteps of the administration. In his first 
year in post, Crocker wrote a piece for the agenda-setting journal Foreign Affairs titled “South 
Africa: Strategy for Change” in which he calls to attention the United States need for 
engagement in order to uphold a consistent pressure for change while reinforcing positive 
movements made by the South African government.10  
The doctrine of constructive engagement, best describes the Reagan administration’s 
activity regarding South Africa. It was created at the beginning of Reagan’s presidency, and was 
ultimately less concerned with apartheid than the threat of communism in Angola, Namibia, and 
South Africa. Constructive engagement did not refer to the imposition of “blueprints or 
timetables for change on the South Africans.” Instead, Crocker used the term as a vague 
explanation in order to acknowledge the realities of a “deeply troubled region,” and the lack of 
leverage the United States realistically held there.11 This work was done in order to put a name to 
the beast, rather than to take a blind and risky stab at the situation.  The change Crocker proposed 
                                               
9 Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1993), 28, 31.  
10 Chester Crocker, “South Africa: Strategy for Change,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 2 (1980/81): 324-325. 
11 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 75.  
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referred to specific small goals, which would mark South Africa moving away from apartheid, 
and included, 
 (1) measures to improve the living conditions and opportunities of the black 
communities; (2) steps that increase black bargaining power by strengthening the 
capacity to organize and to articulate common interests; (3) developing forums and 
procedures that expand the potential for intergroup bargaining and accommodation; (4) 
political-constitutional reform toward power-sharing; and (5) dismantling statutory social 
barriers and discriminatory access to public services and facilities.12 
Despite having written strongly about the United States’ interaction with South Africa, 
Crocker’s influence on African affairs largely involved all of southern Africa, and less so with 
the Reagan administrations connection to the SAG. Though the issue of apartheid was apparent 
throughout Reagan’s presidency, his first term was more widely focused on southern Africa, and 
the political situation between Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. Crocker referred to this 
situation as a linkage, whereas Namibian independence from South Africa was inherently linked 
to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola.13   
In Crocker’s perspective on the situation, he continuously seems to point to the 
precariousness of the United States role in southern Africa. This situation refers to U.S. interests 
in the ending of apartheid, the independence of Namibia, settlement in Angola as well as the 
removal of Cuban troops and Soviet influence, and the overall cold war interests of the United 
States. Seemingly, these interests are not contradictory to one another. The list above is one that 
many Americans working both in and outside of the United States government would reasonably 
support, and yet the situation was fraught with more tensions to work around.     
The case of apartheid inherently held liberal and conservative attention in the United 
States; as an issue of foreign policy, political relationships, civil rights, and business endeavors. 
                                               
12 Crocker, “Strategy for Change,” 347.  
13 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 67. 
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This generated apartheid as a bipartisan issue, eventually being a prevalent part of Congressional 
debates in both the House and the Senate—the House being controlled by Democrats, and the 
Senate by Republicans. In the case of the Reagan administration, however, apartheid was 
primarily a Republican mater debated between the moderate and conservative stances. Influence 
on the matter came from conservative voices, and compromises would be made between the 
Executive branch and the Senate as how to fully address the changing circumstances in southern 
Africa.        
I want to start by briefly explaining what was happening in southern Africa, despite U.S. 
involvement. The first thing to note is the situation of Namibia—still referred to as South West 
Africa in the early 1980s—which was not yet an independent country. Namibia had been put 
under the rule of South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I, allowing apartheid 
laws to apply to Namibia as well as South Africa.14 Beginning in the 1960s, the Namibian War 
for Independence, also known as the South African Border War, was fought between the South 
African Defense Force (SADF), backed by the SAG; and the People’s Liberation Army of 
Namibia (PLAN) which was backed by the South West African People’s Organization 
(SWAPO).15  
At the same time, Angola was in the height of its civil war, which was being fought 
between two military groups. The first being the People’s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) who were backed by Soviet approval, but more importantly supplied with 
Cuban troops. The other group was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
                                               
14 Christopher J. Lee, “Decolonizing of a Special Type: Rethinking Cold War History in Southern Africa,” Kronos 
37 (November 2011):  6, JSTOR. Westad, The Global Cold War, 228. 
15 Salih Abdul-Rahim and Randall Robinson, “New U.S. Policy on South Africa: State Department Documents 
Uncover Developing Alliance,” TransAfrica 1, no. 10 (August 1981), http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-
130-2B46-84-ta%20news%20aug%2081%20opt.pdf. Westad, The Global Cold War, 227-231. 
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(UNITA), which was an anti-communist front openly supported by the United States and South 
African government.16 Both wars were largely intertwined as the different parties were 
connected by mutual allies and preferences in the cold war tensions. The SAG supported the 
SADF fighting against Namibia. SWAPO and the MPLA were connected through Marxist ties 
and backing from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the U.S. supported UNITA and wanted to 
maintain diplomatic ties to the South Africa government.  
The Reagan administration worked toward this linkage through supporting the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 435, which proposed a ceasefire and UN-supervised 
elections in Namibia.17  In Crocker’s words “the logic of linkage blended nicely the broad 
political appeal of ending South African colonialism and racist practices in Namibia (a 
‘motherhood’ issue as well as wise diplomacy for global and regional reasons) with the 
‘strategic’ prize of uprooting the Cubans, freeing Angola, and undercutting Moscow in Africa.”18 
In the eyes of the Reagan administration this was a strategic move in the larger scheme of the 
cold war, in which failure to come to a settlement in Namibia “was not necessarily the worst 
possible outcome,”19 but upheld a stronger message within Reagan’s mission to win. 
Though an anti-communist mentality was potent throughout American understanding of 
world affairs, the pressure seemed to appear strongest from conservative American sources. Such 
influences included the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank created in 1973, 
“dedicated to the principles of free competitive enterprise, limited government, individual liberty 
                                               
16 Westad, The Global Cold War, 227-228. 
17 Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 37-38, 67. 
18 Ibid. 69. 
19 Ibid. 
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and a strong national defense.”20 In 1981 the foundation released an in-depth manual called the 
Mandate for Leadership, which was to act as “a detailed road map to help the fledgling Reagan 
Administration steer the nation into a sound future guided by conservative principles.” Through 
which, “nearly two-thirds of the Mandate’s more than 2,000 specific recommendations has been 
or were being transformed into policy,”21 by the end of Reagan’s first term as president.22  
The success of Heritage during the Reagan administration was due largely in part to the 
Mandate consisting largely of pre-existing conservative ideals, as well as the successful 
marketing of such ideals through the publications.23 At the beginning of Reagan’s second term 
Heritage released another Mandate for Leadership II, in which there were more specific 
proposals for the Department of State to enact in policy toward Africa. The entire section is 
relatively short, with only two paragraphs written on constructive engagement toward South 
Africa, stating: “The U.S. should encourage South Africa to repeal the Mixed Marriages and 
Group Areas Acts and all other aspects of apartheid; it should press for these changes through 
diplomacy. On the other hand, the U.S. should recognize that South Africa already has made 
changes that should be rewarded by loosened restrictions on the export to South Africa for such 
goods as surveillance aircraft and other non-lethal security equipment.”24 This language closely 
resembles other works being published by the Reagan administration. The key similarity 
between Heritage and the Reagan administration is the importance of diplomacy in the work with 
                                               
20 Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher, 26. Charles L. Heatherly, ed., Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a 
Conservative Administration (Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1981). 
21 Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the 
Conservative Revolution (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1984). 
22 Ibid. 
23 John Stahl, “Think Tanks in the Age of Reagan,” in Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American 
Political Culture since 1945 (n.: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 112, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469627878_stahl.7. 
24 Butler, Sanera, and Weinrod, Mandate for Leadership II, 356-357.  
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South Africa. This echoes the notion in Crocker’s argument that the United States barely has a 
leg to stand on in this issue, and that positive engagement is a better tactic for encouraging 
change rather than harsh punishments aimed at apartheid.   
 The Mandate II also emphasized the role of Marxism in Southern Africa, warning of the 
danger of “Marxist-oriented” regimes in Mozambique and Angola. Heritage was outwardly 
supportive of Jonas Savimbi, “the leader of the pro-Western UNITA forces,” in Angola.25 The 
Heritage Foundation also wrote on the need for U.S. involvement in Namibia in order to reach a 
settlement. It states, “SWAPO should be offered one last chance to agree to a Namibian 
settlement. During the same period in which Luanda can agree to plan for the withdrawal of 
Cuban and other foreign military forces in Angola, SWAPO could agree to a plan which includes 
the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia.”26 In this statement the issues in Angola 
and Namibia, though separate countries with different political and colonial histories, are 
compared within the same political context. This statement leads the reader to understand that 
Heritage views the situation in Angola and Namibia as part of the same issue. One that is 
intertwined with an enemy larger than any individual African countries, and which stems from a 
larger ideological debate.  
 In the eyes of the Heritage Foundation as well as other conservative think tanks and 
political groups, the threat of right-leaning foreign political parties was more dangerous than any 
apartheidal government. In keeping American interests in mind, taking a strong stance on 
apartheid was an unnecessary aspect of foreign involvement as compared to the independence 
and civil wars of the neighboring countries, those in which the U.S. relied on for natural 
                                               
25 Ibid. 357.  
26 Ibid. 358. 
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resources. Another of these Marxist regimes, though unofficial, was the African National 
Congress.  
They stood as the largest threat to American interests by holding close ties to the Soviet 
Union, as well as being the next ranking political group to take control in South Africa if 
apartheid were to fall. By this logic, dismantling apartheid was in itself a threat to American 
interests. The Heritage Foundation was one group which spoke openly about the threat of the 
close ties between the ANC and communism. As a Marxist party with financial and military ties 
to the Soviet Union, the ANC was worth fearing. In one executive memorandum written by the 
Heritage Foundation they reveal the true nature behind the ANC and the South African 
Communist Party. Specifically, Heritage cites a document created by the politburo, and explains 
that, “The document not only reveals the close links between the ANC and the communists and 
the way in which the communists exploit the ANC to manipulate Western opinion, but it also 
echoes the success that Communist Parties have had in the past in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Vietnam, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in fooling the West by hiding behind the respectable front of 
‘genuine’ reformist national liberation movements.”27 Through the existence of this document, 
the Heritage Foundation suggests that sympathy for the ANC is a dangerous route for the United 
States, as it can lead to communist sympathies as well. They are also suggesting that though the 
ANC may be a group worthwhile to support for moral reasons, it will ultimately be more 
dangerous for national interests. In response, Heritage suggests, “including U.S. policy toward 
the best-known South African opposition group, the African National Congress (ANC),”28 to 
accompany the harsh sanctions being created against the South African government.       
                                               
27 Memorandum by The Heritage Foundation, “A Secret Communist Document Reveals the Real Game Plan for 
South Africa,” July 10, 1986, Walter Raymond Files RAC Box 8, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
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Throughout the 1980s, apartheid in South Africa became more prevalent as an issue 
among the American public, as independent companies and venues took action. Those with a 
more liberal stance called for the U.S. to stand in opposition against apartheid through the use of 
sanctions, as well as supporting the black majority in South Africa to gain control and 
democratic rights.  While Crocker pushed the Reagan administration to make a deliberate 
engagement through cooperation with the SAG and by leading through example in order to make 
a persuasive change for Namibian independence and the end of apartheid. This engagement, 
however, did not include the use of sanctions. In Crocker’s words, the Reagan administration 
held the stance that “A corollary Western reluctance to address (at least in some channel) the 
question of short- or medium-term goals is rapidly becoming a form of escapism—playing into 
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Chapter Two: Soviet Fears within the Reagan Administration 
 
In the beginning of Reagan’s presidency any work being done toward Africa was largely 
headed by Chester Crocker as the Assistant Secretary of African Affairs, with his focus being on 
the need to be a positive influence for change.  Crocker would evidently be a sincere voice in the 
Reagan administration’s actions toward southern Africa. Despite his honest and well-meant 
efforts, Crocker was not the only opinion in the administration, and other members would 
ultimately play a role in the conceptualization of those actions, actors such as Patrick Buchanan, 
Donald Regan, and Ronald Reagan himself. The more removed outlook brought to the situation 
by these members would eventually be a downfall for the administration in South African 
matters.  
Positive change was the first step in the Reagan administration’s goals toward southern 
Africa. In 1981 Crocker wrote, “Consequently, a basic U.S. objective should be to foster and 
support such change, recognizing the need to minimize the damage to our interests in the 
process, but also recognizing that American interests will suffer inevitably if such change fails to 
occur.”30 His article “South Africa: Strategy for Change” was cognizant of the need for 
engagement with South Africa, but with little definitive plans to go about said work. In fact, his 
efforts seemed to focus much more on southern Africa as a whole at this time, wanting to 
procure peace in a “rough neighborhood.”31  
 In the early work of the American policy toward South Africa created by the Reagan 
administration, Crocker kept close contact with Pik Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
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South Africa, in order to maintain a source of influence and open communications.32 During 
April of 1981 Crocker met with Pik Botha as well as South African Defense Minister Magnus 
Malan, in which one of the objectives was,  
to make it clear to Pik that we share the South African hope that, despite political 
differences among the states of southern Africa, the economic interdependence of the 
area and constructive internal change within South Africa can be the foundations for a 
new era of cooperation, stability, and security in the region. We also share their view that 
the chief threat to the realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region 
of the Soviet Union and its allies.33 
It was made clear through this meeting that though the United States did not share South Africa’s 
views on apartheid, above all they wanted to remain allies in order to act as a united face against 
Soviet presence in Africa. This situation largely followed the cold war mindset of international 
involvement that the United States took—viewing these small nations with relatively little 
significance.  
This was seemingly the advantage to acting positively toward South Africa, in order to 
maintain a relationship with their practically European allies in Africa. In line with the tactics of 
the Reagan administration, Crocker did not support intense economic sanctions against South 
Africa. He argued that the United States walked a thin line between having an influence over 
South Africa and overstepping and antagonizing them, seeing as that the “United States has no 
troops, bases or alliances there, and no coercive influence over any party in the region.”34 This 
view was met with criticism by those who saw constructive engagement as acting too friendly 
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toward the SAG and its apartheid regime.35 But Crocker defended his stance, stating that the 
United States held less power in the situation than most believed, and that if the U.S. were to 
push South Africa too hard, they would break ties completely leaving the United States with no 
influence in the situation.36 
  The United States had interests in all of southern Africa, but held the strongest 
relationship with the South African government. Throughout Reagan’s presidency, it can be 
argued that his administration was on the side of the SAG, and to which affect many argued on 
the side of apartheid. Crocker argued that there was a strong need for western involvement in the 
region in order to support American interests as well as to withhold any exploitation from the 
Soviets.37 At the same time, the U.S. relied on the presence of South Africa.38 For the United 
States to appear as an ally to the SAG, however, they would have to be more lenient in their 
disapproval when it came to apartheid.  
 The action being taken by the Reagan administration’s stance against apartheid faced a 
lot of backlash for the leniency toward South Africa.  For example, as given by TransAfrica, “an 
African American lobby on Africa and the Caribbean,”39 they urged their readers to,  
call or send telegrams to President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig, and Assistant 
Secretary Crocker and tell them that: The U.S. is pursuing a racially oriented foreign 
policy toward South Africa that favors the continued dominance of the white minority 
regime there. The U.S. should oppose the racial oppression of South Africa by serving all 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with Pretoria. The U.S. should also press for 
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immediate internationally supervised elections to be held in Namibia to achieve majority 
rule.40  
This is an example of the very liberal stance on American involvement in southern Africa. 
Naturally, the Reagan administration did not share this viewpoint, and would continue down a 
path of minimal action in favor of persuasion.  
Though Crocker was a key figure for the Reagan administration in the first term, his role 
was eventually pushed to the sidelines as he continued to work with the larger scope of southern 
Africa, and public attention shifted more heavily toward apartheid. In this time of transition, 
South Africa was moved off the back burner for the Reagan administration to center stage and 
more specific policy toward the country was created. Due to this, Reagan was forced to be more 
vocal on the U.S. involvement in South Africa. In September of 1985 President Reagan released 
an executive order in response to the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy and 
economy of the United States,” created by “the policies and actions of the Government of South 
Africa.”41 In this executive order Reagan outlines a list of actions prohibiting trade and other 
transactions between the United States and South Africa. These prohibitions refer more 
specifically to products and services which would be utilized by the South African government, 
military, or police force as a means of enforcing practices and laws of apartheid.42 The goals of 
the Reagan administration’s policy were not to remove all contact and business, but rather to 
remove the U.S. in all forms of the public or private sectors from the practices of apartheid in 
South Africa.  
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This extended to the practices of U.S. businesses in South Africa, which under the 
executive order must subject themselves to principles of practice while conducting business in 
South Africa. Though not officially referenced in the document, the principles listed pertain to 
what are known as the Sullivan principles. These were a set of actions created by a U.S. reverend 
with the goal of limiting U.S. involvement in apartheid through firms conducting business. The 
majority of these practices rule that firms must uphold U.S. practices of legal racial equality in 
the workplace despite South African law.43 Reagan’s executive order was one of few legislative 
documents created by the administration regarding the policy they wished to take toward South 
Africa.  
In the growing American attention for apartheid, congressional response also became 
more vocal. Legislation being pushed through congress quickly changed directions from 
constructive engagement, and instead focused more strongly on tangible actions, such as harsh 
sanctions. Despite this pressure to enforce sanctions against South Africa, the president took a 
more conservative approach and actively opposed strong economic sanctions. There were several 
arguments made against sanctions, which were referenced in many different platforms by both 
the presidential administration and other conservative sources. Most of the argument was simple, 
and was reasoned through the negative effects economic sanctions would have on black South 
African citizens, those already falling victim to apartheid.44 In his veto message for the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 Reagan wrote, “The sweeping and punitive 
sanctions adopted by the Congress are targeted directly at the labor intensive industries upon 
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which the victimized peoples of South Africa depend for their very survival. Black workers—the 
first victims of apartheid—would become the first victims of American sanctions.”45 He also 
wrote on the black workers from the surrounding countries who were employed by South 
African businesses, and who would also be affected by U.S. sanctions.46 In summary, the lives 
and livelihoods of black South Africans was the most articulated argument of the Reagan 
administration against the use of punitive sanctions.  
In fact, the harm sanctions would bring black South African citizens, and Black Africans 
from surrounding countries was a controversial question throughout the Reagan administration. 
In a memo from Walter Raymond Jr.—President Reagan’s assistant and head of international 
communications—to other members of the administration on the regional effects of punitive 
economic sanctions, he wrote,  
In retaliation to the imposition of broad punitive economic sanctions by the United States, 
South Africa could with comparative ease severely damage the economies of its 
struggling, black-ruled neighbors. Many of these countries are totally dependent upon 
South Africa’s transport infrastructure and have no choice but to do business with South 
Africa… The impact of sanctions on the regional neighbors depends on the degree they 
are individually dependent on South Africa and to what extent South Africa ‘shares’ the 
burden of sanctions and possible reduced economic growth.47 
Throughout the document he highlights the dependence of the surrounding countries on South 
Africa.  
Additionally, the Reagan administration kept track of corporations and other groups 
which supported their view against harsh sanctions. In the Walter Raymond files at the Ronald 
Reagan library I found copies of advertisements distributed by The Steel and Engineering 
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Industries Federation of South Africa. In the advertisement an image of a nondescript smiling 
African girl in front of her homestead—a dirt hut with a thatched roof—is standing in the 
crosshairs, with the quote “You can be sure, sanctions against South Africa will find their 
mark.”48 The pointed imagery again places black South Africans in the role of innocent victims 
not only to apartheid, but to all outside decisions being made on their behalf. 
Pat Buchanan, the Assistant to the President, used similar rhetoric in a letter sent out by 
the Office of Public Liaison, writing: “it would inflict further suffering on the people of South 
Africa, black and white, who have only sought to be friends of the United States.”49 
Interestingly, this document, along with the others, pays close attention to the communist threat 
present in South Africa and the careful ground the United States must tread in order to support 
black South African leaders. In the same letter Buchanan wrote “Apartheid is abhorrent. It is not 
the wave of the future in southern Africa. Unfortunately, Communism may be the only 
alternative if America walks away from this vital subcontinent.”50 Though this was a very black 
and white outlook toward the situation in South Africa, it was an honest fear for many in the 
United States. In the debate of who to support in South Africa, the African National Congress 
was always a contested topic. Many understood that they were responsible for much of the work 
being done to fight against apartheid, and that when the South African government would finally 
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allow free democratic elections for all citizens, the ANC would be a strong contender for taking 
the role as leading party.51  
Despite the different viewpoints of American politicians and their constituents, there was 
a realistic fear of only having the ANC to turn to as the next leading political force in South 
Africa when the group acted largely through terrorism and held strong ties to the South African 
Communist Party (SACP). In fact, “the most important Soviet ally in Southern Africa was the 
South African ANC.” This, according to the author Odd Arne Westad, occurred due to Oliver 
Tambo’s close relationship to the Soviet Union, rather than the connection between the South 
African Communist Party and any Euro-Communist affiliates.52 The affiliation would loosen 
throughout the 1980s, and as a younger generation took over leadership in the ANC, the party 
moved away from socialism with the hopes of introducing more “black capitalists” into a 
“market-oriented economy.”53   
The fear of a strong connection between the ANC and the SACP was withstanding, 
however, and in response precautions were put into the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 
1986. There was an amendment made to the CAAA stating that no assistance would be provided 
to the “African National Congress or any affiliated organization until the controlling body of the 
African National Congress no longer includes members of the South African Communist 
Party.”54  Though the CAAA largely impeded on the South African government, with the 
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intention of reducing the hold of apartheidal, there were still restrictions made on the ANC—the 
largest group in South Africa acting against apartheid.   
An additional fear in the cold war realm was the loss of materials and goods provided to 
the United States from South Africa. Several documents collected and written by the Reagan 
administration cited the loss of goods such as chrome, industrial diamonds, platinum, and silver 
bullion.55 In an interview with Robert Evans and Fred Barnes, Donald Regan, Reagan’s Chief of 
Staff, stated “So if we go on the theory that we’re not going to buy anything from South Africa, 
then we’d have to turn to the Soviet Union to buy chrome. Is that what the American people 
really want? I don’t think so.”56 This interview occurred before the CAAA was passed, and the 
statement was made with the hopes of swaying public view against sanctions toward South 
Africa.  
In an article released in the Journal Barron’s in August of 1987, seven months after the 
CAAA was passed, the author Shirley Hobbs Scheibla wrote “While few lawmakers (and almost 
none of their constituents) seem to realize it, such provisions already have succeeded in sharply 
curtailing the flow of strategic and critical materials from South Africa. At the same time, they 
have made the U.S. increasingly—some say alarmingly—dependent for such imports on the 
Soviet Union and its satellites.”57 Those in favor of sanctions made the argument that reduced 
sanctions played into the hands of the Soviet Union. As the Reagan administration continued to 
make allies with the South African government, black radicals turned more toward other allies, 
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including the Soviet Union.58 These opposing viewpoints highlight the legitimate fears of 
communism were a present aspect of all U.S. international involvement. Despite how one might 
have looked at the role of the U.S. toward apartheid in South Africa, there were constant, albeit 
varying tactics of avoiding communist influence on America.       
The seemingly obvious fear of relying on the Soviet Union was at an interesting turning 
point in the Reagan administration. Though the fears of the cold war and communism taking 
control as a global superpower were lasting and ever present in the United States, the situation 
had actually begun to change. In November of 1985 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, met for the first time. The 
Geneva summit, allowed Reagan and Gorbachev to communicate and work on a constructive 
movement forward on the relationship between nations.59 This would also be a lasting moment 
which marked Reagan’s success as a U.S. leader in ending the cold war.  
In hindsight, this marked a shift toward the ending in the cold war, but despite this the 
fear of a Soviet threat and communism endured. In Reagan’s speech to the World Affairs 
Council and Foreign Policy Association in 1986 he stated:  
Southern Africa and South Africa repository of many of the vital minerals—vanadium, 
manganese, chromium, platinum—for which the West has no other source of supply. The 
Soviet Union is not unaware of the stakes. A decade ago, using an army of Cuban 
mercenaries provided by Fidel Castro, Moscow installed a client regime in Angola. 
Today the Soviet Union is providing that regime with the weapons to attack UNITA… If 
this rising hostility in Southern Africa—between Pretoria and the frontline states—
explodes, the Soviet Union will be the beneficiary.60   
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This argument hinged on the question as to what extent the United States should be involved in 
South Africa. To which fact those listening understood that the balance of the cold war was on 
the line, and therefore this was a larger issue than simply African Affairs.  
 For the Reagan administration, this was the persistent argument in their actions against 
South Africa. Reagan was fully aware and sympathetic toward those who fell victim to apartheid. 
But in this administration, there were benefits and risks to carefully weigh, one in which the 
balance of freedom, in not only the United States, but throughout the world, was highly visible. 
Ultimately, the risks of jeopardizing democratic and free enterprise interests, as well as bringing 
further immediate harm on black South Africans outweighed the benefits of taking robust actions 
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Chapter Three: Reagan Decides Against the Act 
 
Heightened congressional response to Apartheid in South Africa became very apparent in 
1985. As unrest continued in South Africa, the South African government seemed to impose 
stronger rule and harsher push back with greater violence. This forced the United States 
government to take a closer look at how they should be responding to the situation. In these next 
two chapters I will analyze what happened in South Africa, and the American response to the 
situation through the analysis of two bills, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 and the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. In this chapter I will address how Reagan 
responded to the threat of harsh sanctions, and in the following chapter how congress ultimately 
decided to overrule Reagan’s actions.  
By the end of July, 1985, a state of emergency had been enacted over most of South 
Africa, “The power to detain was extended to every member of the police, railways police, 
prisons and army,” as well as removed the right of detainees to have any visitors including a 
lawyer. Additionally, the state of emergency added the following amendments to the law,  
No member of the force could be brought to account, by civil suit or criminal charge, for 
unlawful actions in carrying out emergency laws. 
The Commissioner of Police was authorised to impose blanket censorship on press 
coverage of the emergency. 
The Minister of Law and Order was empowered to ban organisations, individuals, or 
publications which were ‘calculated to endanger the security of the State or the 
maintenance of public order.61 
These specifically removed any accountability from members of authority, giving the South 
African government further control over communities deemed “dangerous.” The state of 
emergency would not be lifted until March of 1986. During this time violence due to political 
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unrest skyrocketed, with nearly 600 deaths occurring in the first 6 months, and over half of those 
killed by the police. 
In November of 1985 the SAG banned all television coverage of violence or unrest in 
townships, “in the thirty-eight magisterial districts where the State of Emergency is in force.”62 
This signaled a large sign of deception to much of the world, and even those who had been quick 
to defend the SAG were warry. It was undeniable that the National Party would go to extreme 
lengths, and completely disband the notion of constitutional rights, in order to uphold power over 
the black population. More importantly, the ban on televised news was a signal to foreign powers 
that the SAG was knowingly violating human rights and wanted to keep such facts hidden. In a 
memorandum on July 17 for John Poindexter, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, statistics 
were shared in order to inform him of the U.S. public opinion toward South Africa since the ban 
on media coverage. At this time Poindexter was also involved in the controversial Iran-Contra 
affair, which would eventually send him to jail. The memo cited the effectivity and purpose of 
the ban, stating:  
The number of deaths per month related to political violence in South Africa (Source: 
South African Institute of Race Relations) has remained in the 92-112 range since the 
ban, which is higher than the number of deaths in the two months immediately prior to 
the ban (69 in September and 86 in October).  
The high level of deaths related to political violence suggests that the purpose of the 
media ban, to reduce the number and intensity of violent political demonstrations, has not 
been achieved.  
The large number of deaths relates to political violence since the media ban may be 
indicative of the government’s greater use of force to combat opponents of apartheid in 
the absence of media coverage.63   
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This information was an important aspect of consideration toward the South African 
government, and was a necessary fact to consider in American involvement. It demonstrated the 
lack of South African progress for significant or positive change, and even the Reagan 
administration needed to consider how to address such news. 
Additionally, the memo cited a poll of the American public’s view toward the actions of 
the U.S. government. The poll made in June wrote that “more Americans (49%) think the U.S. 
government’s policy toward apartheid in South Africa is to either accept it to tolerate it than 
believe U.S. policy is to pressure South Africa to make changes (46%).”64 It also noted that 
though “Liberals and blacks” were the most likely to believe these “mistaken” truths about U.S. 
policy, the difference in the view between these groups and others was not very large.  The fact 
of unanimous and large American disapproval of U.S. policy—specifically that made by the 
Reagan administration—foreshadowed the bipartisan Congressional intervention that would 
overrule Reagan’s veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA). I will speak 
further on the CAAA through the lens of congressional action in the next chapter.   
In response to a deteriorating situation in South Africa, congressional efforts increased, 
with the introduction of several bills into congress. Many were proposed by Republican senators 
such as Robert Dole (R-Kansas) and Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), who eventually became 
important actors in the debate for harsher sanctions against South Africa.  In 1985 bills were 
being introduced in both the Senate and the House by Democratic and Republican 
representatives. The bipartisan view toward action grew and in July of 1985 a bill—the Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1985—calling for tougher sanctions was introduced in the House by William 
H. Gray III (D-Pa). The bill passed both the House and the Senate, and was scheduled to hold a 
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House-Senate committee to resolve the differences.65 The bill called for stronger sanctions than 
had ever been proposed before, banning new loans or investments, the sale of computers, as well 
as the import of Krugerrands. Additionally, the bill required that “if the President determines that 
significant progress has not been made, a recommendation on which of specified sanctions 
should be imposed.”66 This requirement sat on a very specific timeline of one year, meaning that 
if South Africa did not show genuine changes to reverse the effects or all together remove the 
apartheidal system, then President Reagan was required to create harsher sanctions. 
The bill, however, did not live to be passed. Instead a compromise between Senators 
Dole and Lugar and the Reagan administration was made which resulted in the release of 
Executive Order No. 12532, outlining provisional sanctions targeted against South African 
military and police forces, as well as banning the import of Krugerrands (South African gold 
coins) and restricting bank loans and technology exports.67 The executive order, however, did not 
include the crucial requirement of harsher sanctions to be imposed a year later if it was 
determined that South Africa had not made any significant progress. 
Though this was a crucial part of the original bill, Reagan’s executive order was enough 
to appease the bipartisan push for an increased American involvement against apartheid. Senator 
Lugar pointed out that endorsing the executive order was the best strategy for the situation. “The 
President’s executive order would supplant the legislation we had worked long and hard to 
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create. We could accept it and not move ahead with our legislation at this time, or we could pass 
the legislation, have it vetoed, and risk losing a vote to override the veto.”68 This action was 
unfavorable to congressional Democrats and right-wing conservatives. Author and academic 
Pauline H. Baker wrote, “The left was unhappy with Reagan’s move because it was seen as 
substitutive for more comprehensive sanctions. Calls for tougher measures continued from 
congressional Democrats. On the other hand, hard-line conservatives believed Reagan’s 
willingness to adopt limited sanctions would tilt the United States toward South African black 
radicals and play into the hands of the Soviet Union.”69 In context, the Reagan administration 
was taking a relatively moderate stance through limited sanctions against South Africa, though in 
less than a year this stance would be tested. 
 Considering the moral nature of the issue, however, there was eventually more 
Democratic and Republican push back against the executive order. Both parties were 
disillusioned with the lack of influence Reagan’s sanctions seemed to hold. More intense 
changes in the situation came about between the summer of 1985 and the spring of 1986. Most 
crucially, during this time the South African government made it clear that pressure through 
constructive engagement was not effective. In May of 1986, as Chester Crocker explains, 
“Suddenly P. W. Botha abandoned any semblance of constructive interaction with Western 
capitals. Like a caged animal, he lashed out in all directions in angry frustration…the SADF 
[South African Defense Force] crashed across the borders of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana 
against ANC targets.”70 In the eyes of almost all international viewers, these actions were 
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completely unjustified as Zimbabwe did not permit the use of their land for guerilla warfare by 
the ANC and Botswana had previously expelled any members of the party months earlier.71  
At the same time, the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), a group 
established by the Commonwealth Nations, was in South Africa investigating apartheid. Through 
their analysis of the situation in South Africa, the EGP released their report in June of 1986 
concluding that the SAG was not pursuing genuine changes to end apartheid. In a letter to 
Reagan, Malcolm Fraser of Australia and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, two members of the 
EPG, wrote, “If substantive action is not forthcoming from the United Kingdom as a result of the 
meeting of Commonwealth leaders in August and also from the United States in the period 
immediately ahead of us, the Black leadership will determine that they are without significant 
support from the West. In these circumstances, they will conclude that political rights will only 
be achieved through greater violence.”72 This was an immediate fear of many political parties, 
who cited violence among black communities as a consequence of apartheid. Additionally, the 
fear was that this violence would be brought to a bloody upheaval in the government.  
 In the same letter, Fraser and Obasanjo noted the fear of violence, and concluded with 
the need for American intervention:  
Pressure through sanctions is the only means remaining to the West to bring about change 
in South Africa. We believe that it would provide a reasonable opportunity to achieve 
change without the resort to greater violence. It should at least delay decisions being 
taken by Black leaders towards greater violence because the more moderate leaders 
would be able to point, for the first time, to substantial and obvious support from the 
West.73  
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This statement, at this point in time, was the strongest evidential report calling for an increase in 
sanctions against South Africa, and was ultimately the largest push for most members of 
congress to agree to harsher sanctions. Additionally, all the members of the Commonwealth 
agreed to intensified actions against South Africa, all except for Britain.74 Despite the evidence 
brought forth by the EPG, the Reagan administration doubled down on its stance for mild 
sanctions and positive reinforcements.  
 The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act was introduced in the House in May of 1986, 
and passed in both the House and the Senate by August. At this time the House was controlled 
by Democrats, and the Senate by Republicans, making this a bipartisan endeavor. The act itself 
details a list of guidelines and sanctions for the United States “to bring about the establishment of 
a nonracial democracy in South Africa.”75 In order for the sanctions to be terminated, the South 
African government would have to uphold the following five requirements.  
(1) releases political prisoners and Nelson Mandela from prison; (2) repeals the state of 
emergency and releases all detainees held under such state of emergency; (3) urbans [sic] 
political parties and permits political freedom for all races; (4) repeals the Group Areas 
Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes no other measures with the same 
purposes; and (5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative 
members of the black majority without preconditions.76 
The Act also largely called for presidential input, communication, and pressure on the South 
African government in order for these sanctions to be effective. In fact, from almost all 
perspectives, there was the understanding that the president needed to take a stance on this 
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debate, and “An immediate and forceful expression of presidential leadership on the issue was 
imperative.”77    
 In his memoir High Noon in Southern Africa, Crocker discusses the shortcomings of the 
administration in July of 1986. In an attempt to take control, Reagan gave a speech to the World 
Affairs Council and Foreign Policy Association on July 22. The original goal of this speech was 
to “be a forceful assertion of presidential vision to clarify U.S. goals, supported by the adoption 
by the President of a range of political and mild economic sanctions.”78 The speech, however, 
was criticized by many as failing to establish any concrete policies toward South Africa, while 
also sending a very polarizing message.   
Crocker critiqued the administration's lack of unity when writing the speech, ultimately 
allowing Communications Director Pat Buchanan to take control over writing the draft. Crocker 
summarized the speech into a powerful short paragraph.  
A presidential veto of economic sanctions was threatened up front. There were two or 
three lines about Pretoria’s official violence and nearly a page of about the ANC 
terrorism and the ‘necklacing’ of blacks by township comrades. South Africa was 
compared favorable to the rest of Africa, and our interests in the region reduced 
essentially to an anti-Communist manifesto. The real bottom line was to keep South 
African’s minerals and ports out of Soviet hands! There was no diplomatic game plan, no 
effort to reposition ourselves in the debate, no call for contact and negotiation with the 
ANC, no regional assistance programs in the Front Line States, and no real call to action 
or threat of action. This draft was not even equivocal; it was pro-Pretoria.79        
This speech ignored any tangible stance against South Africa and neglected the need for concrete 
plans of action. Instead, there was a heavy focus on black violence in South Africa.  
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 Reagan has since caught a lot of heat for his racist political stances, both in and out of the 
United States. Crocker had also expressed his regrets in Reagan’s attitude toward Africa. He 
wrote,  
Sadly, Reagan failed to convey a sense of outrage on racial issues. His comments 
regretting the violence and killings were linked to the argument that much of it was 
blacks killing blacks, a point which implied that the problem was ‘tribal.’... When pressed 
on whether he would ever ‘go beyond friendly persuasion,’ Reagan fell into the trap of 
saying that Botha himself was trying to eliminate apartheid. While there was a kernel of 
reality in his argument, the President tended to discredit his case by sounding so much 
like the government from which he was so reluctant to distance himself.80  
Though the Reagan administration tried their best not to follow the racist leash so easily cast for 
them by supporting—even at a distance—the South African government, there were still many 
instances where the distance was not far enough.   
 In his diaries, Ronald Reagan referred to the tribal nature of South Africa’s problems, 
which pre-existed apartheid. He also took strong stances on which South African leaders were fit 
to interact with the U.S. government. On December 6, 1984 Reagan wrote:  
Bishop Tutu of S. Africa came in. I’m sure he is sincere in his belief that we should turn 
our back on S.A. & take action such as sanctions to bring about a change in race 
relations. He is naive. We’ve made considerable progress with quiet diplomacy. There 
are S. Africans who want an end to Apartheid & think they understand what we are 
doing. American owned firms in S.A. treat their employees as they would in Am. This 
has meant a tremendous improvement for thousands & thousands of S.A. Blacks. There 
have been other improvements but there is still a long way to go. The Bishop seems 
unaware, even though he himself is Black, that part of the problem is tribal not racial. If 
apartheid ended now there still would be civil strife between the Black tribes.81  
Throughout Reagan’s diaries, in fact, he never refers to the violence committed by the South 
African government on the black communities within South Africa. Instead, apartheid is referred 
to in the abstract.  
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 Additionally, the violent acts of the ANC were labeled as terrorist acts, while the acts of 
the SAG were labeled as defensive maneuvers by the Reagan administration. “In defending their 
society and people, the South African Government has a right and responsibility to maintain 
order in the face of terrorists,” Reagan explained in his speech on July 22.  As well as explaining 
that though the SAG was partially to blame for the unrest and violence in the country, by going 
“beyond the law of necessity,” they are acting as “contributors” rather than the source or 
perpetrators of such acts.82  
 In this speech, Reagan also brought up a very interesting point in the American view 
toward South Africa, citing the British historian Paul Johnson. He stated, “that South Africa is an 
African country as well as a Western country.”83 This is an important notion when discussing the 
racial element of international interactions. In the case of the U.S. and South African relationship 
we have come to understand the circumstance as two majority white governments interacting 
with one another. Reagan’s statement on South Africa falling on the lines between an African 
and a Western nation points out a key viewpoint in the Reagan administration. It is essentially a 
code for South Africa being a white nation in a black continent, and inherently so an ally to other 
Western—or white—nations. This was an obvious fallacy seeing as South Africa had a 
population of over eighty percent people of color, and yet with a white led government, one 
based in a similar history as the United States, was seemingly less threatening. Additionally, 
many have argued that it is in this fact that the Reagan administration had appeared more 
forgiving toward the transgressions of the South African government. 
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 Despite the very truthful outlook at the racial relationship between South Africa and other 
Western governments, Ronald Reagan’s speech was still a very polarizing action among 
American politicians. The bipartisan agreement to act against apartheid was not enough to thwart 
Reagan’s decision to veto the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in September of 1986. 
However, it passed in both the House and the Senate over Reagan’s veto, which was one of the 
“most decisive defeats for Reagan’s foreign policy during his eight years in the White House.”84 
Of course, there were differences in outlooks toward how to approach apartheid in South Africa 
between Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Liberals thought any leniency in sanctions 
was an aid to the apartheidal regime. Conversely, the more conservative viewpoint, such as that 
of Richard Lugar, was to enhance economic outreach through “educational assistance to black 
South Africans, a human rights fund for legal and humanitarian assistance to blacks, provision of 
Export-Import Bank loans to black-owned businesses, and direction to other U.S. agencies to 
assist blacks to expand their role in the South African economy.”85 Lugar, along with many other 
Republican representatives which supported the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 
looked at United States business in South Africa as a means of leverage and assistance to those 
effected most in South Africa.  
Of course, business was a major factor of the Reagan administration’s argument against 
harsh sanctions throughout 1985 and 1986. Despite this, the rift between the congressional 
Republican viewpoint and that of the Republican administration came in May of 1986 with the 
findings of the Eminent Persons Group. With their findings urging for stronger Western action in 
order to produce a genuine change in the policies of the South African government, the 
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congressional decision was made. This time there would be no compromise or executive order.  
The Reagan administration ultimately decided that communism and apartheid were mutually 
exclusive, with only one being worthwhile in strong American involvement. In the Reagan 
administration’s failing to change its perspective, there was no choice but to push the CAAA of 
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Chapter Four: The Life of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 
 
 Having looked at Reagan’s response to the Anti-Apartheid Acts being released in 1985 
and 1986, it is important to note how Congress responded. Returning to May of 1986, we can 
look more closely at the creation, debate, and passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act 
of 1986 through the House and Senate. This bill would mark a major Congressional upheaval 
over a presidential veto, and exemplifies a rift between the Republican controlled Senate and the 
Executive Branch.    
Though President Reagan’s executive order was released in September of 1985, further 
bills were introduced into the House and Senate with the hopes of bringing about stronger 
actions against South Africa. By May of 1986 a new Anti-Apartheid Act had been introduced to 
the House, again by Pennsylvania representative William H. Gray III (D-PA). At the same time, 
in fact on the same day, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) introduced a very similar bill into the 
Senate.  Kennedy’s bill was introduced as the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The bill called for 
harsher sanctions, banning all exports and investments to South Africa, banning involvement in 
the computer industry, and increased assistance for South Africans, specifically those affected by 
apartheid. In the introduction of this bill, there were statements given by several American 
spokespeople and groups, such as the Reverend John T. Walker, the Episcopal Bishop of 
Washington, the National Education Association, TransAfrica, and the Washington Office on 
Africa. Each of which represented the American, albeit mostly liberal, view toward supporting 
sanctions in South Africa.86  
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Kennedy’s bill however, did not last long in the Senate, as it was assigned to the 
subcommittee on International Finance, where it was decidedly superseded by H.R. 4868. 
Interestingly, H.R. 4868 was introduced into the House with little introduction, in the 
congressional records for the House on May 21, the bill was introduced simply as: “H.R. 4868. A 
bill to prohibit loans to, other investments in, and certain other activities with respect to, South 
Africa, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Banking, Finance 
and Urban Affairs, Ways and Means, and Public Works and Transportation.”87 Despite it’s 
brevity, it would pass successfully through the House and the Senate, as well as over the 
President’s veto. 
The bill appeared in Congressional reports again on June 11, as Gray gave further 
testimony for the need to pass H.R. 4868. He cited the changes in South Africa since the 
previous year, pointing out the need for harsher sanctions since the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 
had been proposed. “Mr. Speaker and colleagues, the racist Government of South Africa is at it 
again. New emergency restrictions providing broad powers to arrest without trial, without 
hearing, and to detain without limitations have now been put into place. These are more 
extensive than last year's restrictions, which were condemned by all democracies in the Western 
World.”88  
On June 18, H.R. 4868—the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was voted on in the House. In 
which the bill was cited as:  
H.R. 4868 prohibits new loans and investments to South Africa; bars the importation of 
South African uranium, coal, and steel; prohibits the use of United States technology or 
services to develop new energy sources in South Africa, denies landing rights to South 
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African aircraft; and bars United States firms from mining and exporting natural 
resources from the South African-controlled territory of Namibia. The bill also requires 
the withdrawal of all United States investments in South African computer businesses 
and prohibits the export of computers to South Africa after 1 year... All of the sanctions 
imposed by this measure can be terminated only if the President reports to Congress that 
the South African Government has dismantled apartheid or has freed all political 
prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and has begun good faith negotiations with 
representative black leaders. The President's findings must then be approved by Congress 
through passage of a joint resolution.89  
This statement laid out the most important aspects of the bill. I am categorizing these 
requirements as the most important because, though it was hoped they would be the most 
effective and ultimately harmful against apartheid itself, these requirements were also the most 
restrictive for the United States.  
This congressional meeting took place just days after the SADF raids into Zambia, 
Botswana, and Zimbabwe. This was a large aspect of the argument among many of the 
representatives speaking on behalf of harsher sanctions. They pointed to the raids as evidence of 
the worsening situation in South Africa, specifically in the actions taken by the South African 
government and its Afrikaner defenders. Representative Wolpe (D-MI) noted “During the last 21 
months, more than 1,700 people have been murdered in South Africa, most of them killed by 
security forces or Government-aided ‘vigilantes.’ In the last year, the South African Government 
has arrested more than 40,000 people on political charges.”90 A major aspect of arguing for 
sanctions was the faith that sanctions would force the SAG to make a positive progress, rather 
than expecting persuasion to do the same. 
Criticism of Reagan’s executive order was also noted in the congressional record. The 
creator of the Anti-Apartheid Act—of 1986 and 1985—William H. Gray III (D-PA), pointed out 
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that reform was not always a viable system to defend apartheid. Gray pointed out that mixed race 
marriages no longer illegal was often cited to prove the repeal of apartheid. In response to which, 
Gray stated “I was in South Africa in January. I talked with many of the leaders of the majority 
population who are oppressed, and not one of them in any conversation said to me that mixed 
marriages were at the top of their agenda or a major goal. And, thus, to point to that as a reform 
is absolutely ludicrous; particularly when denied the right to vote.”91 His argument underlies the 
minimal reformations South Africa had made when left unburdened by the objections of other 
nations, and therefore his argument for once again presenting an anti-apartheid bill to the House. 
In response to Gray’s statements, several congressmen who stood in opposition of the 
Anti-Apartheid Act and the sanctions it stood for, expressed disapproval for being labeled as 
“defenders of apartheid.” Representative Burton (R-IN) argued, “Conversely, if we impose the 
kind of sanctions that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are asking us to impose today, 
it is my feeling that chaos will evolve out of this; that the African National Congress and other 
Communist organizations will grow in strength and we are going to see a real bloodbath. Much 
worse than what we see right now. The benefactors of that will be the Communist Party and, of 
course, the Soviet Union.”92 This statement, similar to the arguments used by the Reagan 
administration, was the strongest argument against H.R. 4868.  
Burton’s statements also reflected Reagan’s candor on race when discussing the 
impending end of apartheid. In his argument against the Anti-Apartheid Act, Burton often cited 
the loss of South Africa’s civilization as one of the negative effects of U.S. sanctions. In the 
congressional report he stated, “The question is not whether or not we are for apartheid but how 
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do you end it and how do you end it in such a way so that that entire nation does not go back into 
the dark ages?”93   
Over the hours on June 18, the different perspectives toward H.R. 4868 were shared, 
flipping between those that fully supported the bill, and those who disagreed with its power and 
proposed actions. A key factor of this debate was the question of doing whatever it took (short of 
military action) to inflict power to undermine apartheid. Representative Lantos (D-CA), a firm 
supporter of the Act, brought the debate of apartheid into an extreme comparison, as something 
that must be worked against no matter what. “Some pieces of legislation... are what I call 
‘cannibalism issues.’ Cannibalism issues are like cannibalism. You are either for cannibalism or 
you are against cannibalism. There are no degrees of cannibalism. There is no phasing out of 
cannibalism. Cannibalism is to be rejected, and apartheid is to be rejected.”94  
Additionally, Lantos put the issue of an escalating communist front in South Africa into 
another black and white picture. “If we wish to facilitate the coming to power of a Communist 
regime, let us prolong apartheid. It will surely come. The one hope that we have of preserving a 
non-Communist society in South Africa is to provide the people of South Africa—all the people 
of South Africa—the fundamental freedoms and beliefs that we cherish and value.”95  Trying his 
best to bend the threat of communism in favor of sanctions against apartheid, Lantos addressed a 
very serious concern.      
 On the other side of this debate fell the apprehension toward sanction and the unrelenting 
fear of its negative impacts. These arguments are what were utilized by the Reagan 
administration, often to convey the need to reduce sanctions rather than the need to reduce 
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apartheid. Reagan’s vocalization on South Africa was often linked more strongly to the need to 
maintain an active image as a leader on the issue, rather than from a genuine interest in 
dismantling apartheid. Despite Reagan falling short on this front, many other Republicans, 
especially those who supported the more conservative view against sanctions, were careful and 
more thoughtful when discussing apartheid.   
Many Republicans took the stance that the United States was obligated to maintain an 
active role against apartheid, though were careful to actively support sanctions. Others pointed 
out the need for adaptation to correct a further-deteriorating situation. Representative Bliley (R-
VA) spoke on the need for H.R. 4868, as the next step beyond Reagan's executive order from the 
year before.  “I was pleased when President Reagan removed the need for H.R.1460 [the Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1985] last year by imposing virtually all of its provisions by Executive order. 
That method put those measures into effect more quickly than the legislative process allows and 
put the weight of the American Presidency as well as the American Congress behind those 
actions. Now, however, 9 more months have passed and progress in South Africa seems to be 
struck [sic] between very slow and backward.” Bliley also took a role as a moderate supporter of 
the bill, as he was apprehensive of its form, but not its capabilities.  “I have some misgivings 
about H.R. 4868... this bill has been hastily written and that it includes language and provisions 
that may have impacts far beyond the intent of the sponsors of the legislation. I have no doubt 
that these discrepancies and shortcomings in the bill can and will be corrected long before H.R. 
4868 becomes law.”96   
On the farthest side of the argument were those who opposed strong sanctions. Among 
those was Representative Siljander (R-MI), who despite this took an active role in the 
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conversation and stance against apartheid. He had introduced his own bill into the House in 
1985, which proposed using diplomatic means and fair employment principles in order to “be a 
positive influence in ending apartheid in South Africa.”97 Though this bill did not get past being 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Siljander maintained an active role on his stance 
toward South Africa.   
Siljander held an important role, both in a historical context and in congress at the time, 
pointing out the nuances in the situation between the U.S. and South Africa.  In the congressional 
report for June 18, he stated, “We are truly a great nation. We are a great and powerful country 
that can send very pointed signals all over the world. Ronald Reagan's Executive order calling 
for four sanctions, the Sullivan Principles and aiding blacks and entrepreneurial and scholarship 
activities, have sent a clear message. The hours and hours of debates on the floor of the Congress 
and in the subcommittees and the full committees have sent messages.”98 This point works well 
to summarize the nature of the Anti-Apartheid Act in Congress, but ultimately the debate around 
H.R. 4868 continued for nearly 80 pages, with many of the same arguments—both for and 
against sanctions—being made back and forth.  
The hours of debates had perhaps sent many mixed messages to the government and 
people of South Africa. But the existence of this large debate has also sent a very clear message 
to historians—this was not a trivial situation. The question of how the United States should 
respond to apartheid in South Africa brings into focus issues of morality and American interests, 
many of which the United States had already struggled with in its history. The ultimate 
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understanding of the situation was not a question as to whether apartheid was something worth 
addressing. Despite the outlook of the members of Congress, the answer was unmistakable —
apartheid was a very necessary and concerning matter for the United States to be involved in.  
Ultimately, the bill passed in the House through a vote by voice, with two amendments. 
The first amendment was an action against the ANC designed, “to prevent any assistance to the 
African National Congress or any affiliated organization until the controlling body of the African 
National Congress no longer includes members of the South African Communist Party.”99 The 
other amendment strengthened the language of the bill, replacing the statutes with the following 
expectations: “to prohibit any U.S. person or corporation from investing in, importing from, or 
exporting to South Africa; to require immediate withdrawal or disinvestment of all U.S. assets in 
South Africa; to prohibit imports of all articles grown and produced in South Africa except of 
goods, technology, or information; and to permanently ban the importation of gold 
Krugerrands.”100 This call for more intense sanctions passed in the House with very little push 
back from more Republicans who assumed, “that it was so extreme that the Senate would either 
ignore it or President Reagan would veto anything remotely similar, and see his veto upheld,” 
according to Senator Lugar.101  
Nearly two months later, in August, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 was 
discussed in the Senate. This was a separate bill from H.R. 4868 introduced into the House by 
Gray. Instead this bill—S. 2701—was originally introduced by Senator Lugar (R-KA), the head 
of the Foreign Relations Committee. This bill  
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would prohibit South Africa Airways from operating in the United States, prohibit 
importation of products from government-controlled industries, ban imports of coal and 
uranium, bar new U.S. loans to the government and any new from accepting deposits… If 
apartheid was ended, Nelson Mandela and other political leaders were freed, and talks 
between whites and blacks began, the President could lift all the sanctions immediately. 
If nothing happened for twelve months, the President would be obligated to impose 
additional sanctions from a long list provided in the bill.102  
Lugar was also an important figure in the actions against South Africa. As a strong supporter of 
Reagan, he worked closely with the administration to garner support for his bill, the goal of 
which was to outstand the obstacles created by the liberal Democrats in the House as well as to 
pass in the Senate over the objection of conservative Republican senators.103 
 The challenge of passing the bill through the Senate—controlled by Republicans—was 
finding a comprehensive balance between pushing the limit in favor of sanctions, but not too far 
as to “turn off any hope of a Presidential signature, or, finally any hope of veto override.”104 
After hours of this debate, of push and pull towards the correct measures for sanctions that would 
be successful—both in being passed but as well as being effective against apartheid—a vote was 
made. Senator Lugar moved “to strike all after the enacting clause of H.R. 4868 and insert the 
text of S. 2701 as amended.”105 To the astonishment of everyone involved, including Lugar, H.R. 
4868 was passed in the Senate with an 84-14 vote.106   
In less than a month the House and Senate differences were resolved, and by late 
September H.R. 4868, now known as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), 
was being presented to the president. Having surpassed the feat of resolving congressional 
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differences on a highly contested topic, it was well known that the largest challenge facing the 
bill would now be a veto by Reagan. Luckily, Lugar was in good standing with the Reagan 
administration, working closely with George Shultz, John Poindexter, and Donald Regan in 
order to obtain Reagan’s signature on the CAAA. But after Reagan’s speech on the matter in 
July, it was clear that a veto was likely, and as Lugar worked further with Reagan between 
August and September, this fact became clear. As a strong supporter of Reagan, Lugar was 
hesitant to undermine his decisions.  
I would not have persisted in opposing the president if after all these conversations, 
debates, and statements I had developed reasonable confidence in his comprehension of 
what the South African situation was all about. The administration's handling of African 
issues for six years have been a series of unfortunate failures. George Shultz and Don 
Regan we're attempting to keep foreign policy clearly in presidential hands with 
improvised executive orders, adopting much of the language that I had worked through 
the legislative process. But these last-minute ‘saves’ did not remove the impression that 
the president's normal passion for democracy and freedom seemed to diminish when 
Africa came into view.107  
Ultimately, Lugar made the decision to push for an override of the President’s veto. 
It is a very interesting point that Reagan was entirely unwilling to compromise on the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. It ultimately did more harm to the image of the 
administration than it would have had they gone along with the plan of the Senate Republicans. 
Reagan himself held very little stakes in the outcome of South Africa, so he had little to lose. 
Why not compromise? Ultimately, according to Crocker, the failure of the Reagan administration 
came down to their inability to organize themselves around a common goal and produce a 
specific plan to counter the sanctions. “Admittedly, a self-destructive battle within the 
administration over how to handle the congressional politics of the issue contributed to this result 
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by assuring substantial Republican defections.”108 There was “no hope in sustaining a veto unless 
it were accompanied by a credible alternative—that is, by fresh evidence of administration 
initiatives, backed by another set of sanctions promulgated by executive order.”109  
 The work fell seemingly entirely on George Shultz, the Secretary of State, who worked 
on developing initiatives in the short few weeks that would be effective, testing them in the 
waters of Congress to stimulate reactions. Meanwhile, members in the White House—Buchanan, 
Regan, and Poindexter—were busy interjecting with “politically irrelevant right-wing 
activist.”110 A goal was set a week before the deadline of the veto, and in which the veto message 
“would announce the Shultz mission, our assistance initiative for Southern Africa and black 
South Africans, and the ambassadorial appointment of Edward Perkins.” Additionally, it would 
“outline a new executive order, including the bill’s general statement of policy goals… and a 
number of sanctions drawn from the legislation.”111 Despite Shultz’s best efforts, the work of the 
White House purposefully tripped up any pragmatic initiatives coming out of the Reagan 
administration in order to appease the far right. Crocker explains Buchanan’s “goal was to 
prevent any deal” between congressional Republicans and the administration so as to displace 
any sanctions, while “Poindexter and Regan appeared unwilling to tell Reagan the hard fact that 
he was headed for a political foreign policy disaster.”112 What was finally signed as Reagan’s 
veto message of the CAAA was a less bitter version of Reagan’s July 22 speech. Both the speech 
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and veto message are a lasting testament to the effects of Buchanan’s hand in the Reagan 
administration, and was not be enough to withstand the decisions of the Senate.    
On September 29, the veto was deliberated in the House. Again, the same arguments 
appeared: What harm will this bring to South Africans? Is apartheid not akin to Nazism? What is 
most likely to lead to a communist take-over? After nearly two hours of debate a vote was made. 
The House passed the CAAA with a vote of 313-83. Three days later, the Senate took the same 
route, with a vote of 78-21, an incredible feat as it was “the first and only foreign policy veto of 
President Reagan which had not been sustained, and the first override of a presidential veto in a 
major foreign policy legislation since 1973.”113 With this final passing of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the bill was enacted into law.   
U.S. involvement did not end with the passing of the CAAA, nor did apartheid. In fact, 
the CAAA would not be repealed, having found South Africa to have fulfilled the requirements, 
until George H. W. Bush started his first term as president. Apartheid was not considered 
officially over until the first Democratic election in South Africa occurred in 1994. Instead, the 
passing of the CAAA is a direct result of a lack of African policy made by the Reagan 
administration, where the lack of genuine investment was palpable, so much so that even strong 
supporters of Reagan felt obligated to act opposite of his interests. The Reagan administration 
was outnumbered by Congressional action in its stance toward South Africa and apartheid. This, 
however, still allowed for successes in African policy made by the Reagan administration. In the 
time after the passing of the CAAA, Crocker continued to work within the Reagan 
administration on African affairs. Though strong U.S. action toward apartheid can be credited to 
                                               
113 Lugar, Letters to the Next President, 240. Congressional Report- House, H.R. Rep. No. 99-27101 (Sept. 29, 
1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1986-pt19/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1986-pt19-2-2.pdf. 
Congressional Report- Senate, S. Rep. No. 99-27826 (Oct. 2, 1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-
CRECB-1986-pt19/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1986-pt19-5-1.pdf. 
             55 
Congress, the Reagan administration also established some defeats. In 1988 Angola, Cuba, and 
South Africa signed the Nations Security Council Resolution 435, “calling for Cuba to get its 
troops out of Angola.”114 Crocker credits this success to the increase in American attention on 
apartheid. “In the summer of 1985, we used the threat of mounting anti-apartheid fervor and the 
growth of pro-‘freedom-fighter’ sentiment in the United States to create a time pressure on both 
Pretoria and Luanda.”115  
Evidently, Crocker would not have been successful in his work in southern Africa if the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 had not been a major aspect of congressional and 
executive attention. Throughout 1985 and 1986 a conflict rose between the Reagan 
administration and Congress as it became clear to actors passionate about ending apartheid in 
that Ronald Reagan did not hold the understanding needed to make a positive impact. The 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 stands as a case study for how the American Federal 
Government works in its truest form. While addressing a highly contested topic, we see the 
relationship between the presidential administration and Congress, the efforts between the two 
houses controlled by different parties, and a bill ultimately being passed into law on the matter 
despite considerable opposition. It was the successes of the Executive and Legislative branches 
of the U.S. government which both held an impactful role in the actions of one another, and in 
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